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FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
An Indecent (Speech) Decision?
(George Carlin's "Filthy Words")
The United States Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'
held that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) had the power to regulate an indecent but not obscene radio
broadcast. The Court thus announced a new category of restricted speech
under the first amendment. In its very narrow holding, the Court
concluded that FCC regulation of a George Carlin monologue containing
indecent language, "patently offensive words dealing with sex and
excretion,' '2 was not constitutionally infirm. The rationale of the Court's
opinion, however, is ambiguous both with respect to the constitutional
propriety and the permissible scope of such regulation. This Case
Comment will examine the Court's opinion and will demonstrate that: (1)
the ambiguity of the Court's opinion regarding the constitutional
propriety of regulation under the facts of Pacifica can be explained by the
failure of such regulation to comport with traditional first amendment
notions of content-based regulation; and (2) the failure of the Court to
establish principled limits on the regulatory power of the FCC will lead to
significant chilling effects on protected speech.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Facts
On October 30, 1973 at approximately 2:00 p.m., station WBAI-FM,
New York, New York, licensed to Pacifica Foundation, aired a pre-
recorded twelve-minute comedy routine entitled "Filthy Words" taken
from a live album by George Carlin. The routine was aired during the
broadcast of a live program dealing with "contemporary society's attitude
toward language. 3 Listeners were invited to call in and discuss this topic
with the program host. The Carlin monologue was broadcast near the end
of the program because the station "regarded [it] as an incisive satirical
view of the subject under discussion. 4 Immediately prior to the broadcast
of this material the station informed listeners of its "sensitive content" and
advised them that anyone who might find the broadcast offensive should
turn the program off for fifteen minutes. The routine parodied what Carlin
1. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
2. Id. at 3038.
3. Id. at 3030.
4. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975), clarified, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
described as the words one cannot say over the public airwaves. 5 Carlin
repeated these words over and over again, illustrating and satirizing the
various societal contexts in which they were used, in an attempt to
illustrate his theory that societal attitudes towards these words are
"essentially silly."' 6 After the broadcast the FCC received a complaint from
a man in New York City claiming to have heard the program while driving
in his car with his son.7 Thereafter, the FCC commenced this action against
Pacifica Foundation in an attempt to clarify the standards for regulating
indecent language.
The following standards were established. The Commission defined
indecency as "patently offensive" language"as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium" that describes "sexual or
excretory activities and organs."8 Primary concern was voiced over the
airing of indecent language "at times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience . . . .9 Obscene language was
distinguished by noting that indecent language "(1) . . .lacks the
element of appeal to the prurient interest . .. and that (2) when children
may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has
literary, artistic, political or scientific value."' 0 In the first FCC order it was
unclear whether indecent speech would be completely banned from radio:
When the number of children in the audience is reduced to a minimum, for
example during the late evening hours, a different standard might
conceivably be used. The definition of indecent would remain the same ...
However, we would also consider whether the material has serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value, as the licensee claims. .... 11
Two of the commissioners voiced a clear opinion that indecent language
should be prohibited from the airwaves at all times, one commissioner
commenting that "garbage is garbage."' 2 The Commission also sought to
support its standard by pointing to the privacy interest of unwilling adult
listeners in their homes.
Initial reaction to the standard developed in this case forced the FCC
to issue a clarifying statement. In a subsequent memorandum the FCC
emphasized its earlier position that its treatment of indecent speech was
based on a nuisance analogy and maintained that it never intended an
absolute ban of this type of language but only sought to channel this
language to times of the day when children would not be in the audience.
The Commission further noted that it did not intend to hold broadcasters
5. Id. at 95. The list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.
6. Id. at 96.
7. The son was 15 years old at the time. BROADCASTING, July 10, 1978, at 20.




12. Id. at 102-03.
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liable if such language was broadcast in connection with live coverage of
public events because "it did not intend to 'stifle robust, free debate on any
of the controversial issues confronting our society.' 03
The FCC declined to impose any of the statutory sanctions1 4 within
its power because the Commission's purpose in bringing this action
against Pacifica was to clarify the indecency standard. Rather, the Com-
mission chose to associate the letter of complaint with the station's license
file for consideration only upon receipt of any subsequent complaints
about the station's programming.
The Court of Appeals reversed, with each of the three judges filing
separate opinions. Judge Tamm, writing for the court, initially concluded
that the FCC's action was prohibited by section 326 of title47 of the United
States Code which prohibits censorship by the FCC.'5 Judge Tamm also
held that the indecency standard established by the FCC was both
overbroad and vague." In a concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon
considered the constitutional propriety of indecent speech regulation and
concluded that the FCC's definition of indecent speech was "massively
over-broad."' 7 Judge Bazelon found no substantial invasion of the privacy
interest of nonconsenting adults18 and found that the presence of children
in the radio audience did not necessitate broad regulation.1 9 Judge
Leventhal in dissent stressed both the narrowness of the Commissions
holding and the "compelling state interest" in protecting children.20
B. Statutory Holdings
The Supreme Court initially considered two statutory issues. 21 The
first concerned whether the Commission's action violated the Federal
13. 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 892, revd, 556 F.2d 9 (1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
14. See note 21 infra.
15. 556 F.2d 9, 14 (1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 26-27.
19. Id. at 28-29.
20. Id. at 37.
21. The powers of the FCC in this area are grounded on both specific and general statutory
grants. The statutes creating specific powers in the FCC to deal with indecent speech are as follows.
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides,
whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication shall be fined not more than S 10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both ....
Section 1464 does not by itself provide a statutory basis for FCC sanctions. Any prosecution instituted
under § 1464 would originate in the Justice Department. The following statutes, however, incorporate
§ 1464 for the purpose of providing the FCC with specific administrative powers.
47 U.S.C. § 312 (1970) provides,
(a) The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit-
(6) for violation of section 1304, 1343, or 1464 of Title 18.
(b) Where any person . . . (2) has violated or failed to observe any of the provisions
of this Act, or section 1304, 1343, or 1464 ofTitle 18. . . . the Commission may order
1979]
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anticensorship statute.22 Relying on the fact that both the anticensorship
provision and section 1464, the provision prohibiting the use of "obscene,
indecent, or profane" language on radio, were enacted as part of the same
section in the Radio Act of 1927, the Court concluded that Congress
intended to give meaning to both provisions. 23 The Court construed the
anticensorship provision as limiting only prior restraints on program-
ming.24 The statute was held inapplicable to the evaluation of past
programming practices for license renewal purposes. This issue was not a
subject of debate among the Justices.
The second and critical statutory issue concerned the proper
construction of the term "indecent" under section 1464.25 This issue served
as a focal point for a dispute between the majority and a four-member
dissent led by Justice Stewart. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
maintained that the "plain language" of the statute contemplated
regulation of more than the obscene. First, he noted that "the words
'obscene, indecent, or profane' [were] written in the disjunctive, implying
that each [had] a separate meaning."2 6 Second, Justice Stevens indicated
that the Commission's interpretation of section 1464 had for a "long" time
encompassed more than the obscene. 27 Finally, the Court concluded that
such person to cease and desist from such action.
47 U.S.C. § 503 (1970) provides,
(b) (I) Any licensee or permittee of a broadcast station who-
(E) violates section 1304,1343, or 1464 of Title 18, shall forfeit to the United States a
sum not to exceed $1,000. Each day during which such violation occurs shall
constitute a separate offense. Such forfeiture shall be in addition to any other
penalties provided by this chapter.
The Commission's specific powers are significantly enhanced by 47 U.S.C. 303 (1970) which provides,
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall-
(g) Study new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally
encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest ....
This provision has traditionally given the FCC very broad regulatory power over the radio industry,
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & EcON. 15 (1967); Robinson, The F. CC. and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67
(1967). The powers of the FCC over the broadcast industry, although broad, are not without
limitation. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides,
Nothing in this chaptershall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications of signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970); see note 21 supra.
23. 98 S. Ct. at 3033.
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); see note 21 supra.
26. 98 S. Ct. at 3035.
27. Id. at 3036; The accuracy of this conclusion is particularly suspect since prior to 1970 there
was no attempt by the FCC to distinguish between the indecent and the obscene. See Eastern Educ,
Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970). After Eastern the distinction between indecent and obscene was
blurred in Sonderling Corp., 27 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2D 285, reconsidetation denied, 41 F.C.C.2d 777
(1973), affdsub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcastingv. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C, Cir. 1975).
The primary reason for the FCC action against Pacifica Foundation was the desire of the Commission
to clear up the ambiguities in this area. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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Congress did not intend to impose the same limitations on indecent speech
in broadcast as in other contexts, relying on the familiar proposition that
"the first amendment has special meaning in the broadcast context."28
The dissent construed the term "indecent" as having the same
meaning as the term "obscene" developed in Miller v. California.2' In
support of this construction Justice Stewart pointed to the other statutes
found in the same chapter of the United States Code entitled "obscenity."
30
He noted that on each occasion that those statutes had previously been
considered, the Court had construed "indecent" to mean "obscene."31
Although the statutes in this chapter had been enacted separately, they
were codified together in the Criminal Code of 1948.32 Due to the close
relation of the statutes, Justice Stewart indicated that the word "indecent"
should be interpreted consistently throughout the chapter. Moreover, the
principle that the Court must, if possible, construe a statute to avoid
consideration of its constitutionality was also stressed.33 Since the FCC
readily conceded that the Carlin monologue was not "obscene" under the
Miller test, the dissent maintained that the statute was inapplicable to the
speech in question. Thus, the dissent would not have reached the
fundamental issue of the constitutional propriety of regulating indecent
speech.
The inclusion of this brief recitation of the statutory issues addressed
in Pacifica serves to illustrate a crucial point. The Court was anxious to
impose some degree of regulation upon the broadcasting of indecent
speech. Had the Court adopted the dissent's approach, no regulation of
indecent speech would have been permissible under the current statutory
scheme, notwithstanding the Commission's broad regulatory powers
under the "public interest" statute.34 The Court's statutory interpretation
thus cleared the way for a consideration of the constitutional issues.
C. Constitutional Holdings
Pacifica lodged two constitutional attacks against the Commission's
order. It contended first that the Commission's construction of the
statutory language was overly broad and thus impermissibly affected both
protected and unprotected speech. Pacifica's second and crucial argument
was aimed at the general constitutional propriety of regulating indecent
speech.
Responding to Pacifica's first contention, a majority of the Court
28. 98 S. Ct. at 3036 n.17. See text accompanying notes 86-90 & 153-58 infra.
29. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 (1976);The title of§ 1464, the indecency statute under consideration,
is "Broadcasting obscene language." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
31. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3056 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3055 n.2.
34. "IThe general language of[47 U.S.C. § 303(g), the public interest statute] cannot be used to
circumvent the terms of a specific statutory mandate such as that of§ 1464." Id. at 3055 n.3 (citations
omitted).
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concluded that the overbreadth challenge was meritless. The majority
maintained that the FCC order should be read narrowly as an ad hoc
determination "issued in a specific factual context" 3 and that the
Commission had not "engaged in formal rulemaking or the promulgation
of regulations. 36 The width and breadth of the FCC definition of
indecency were therefore not evaluated. In the plurality portion of his
opinion, Justice Stevens noted that although the Commission's order
might lead to self-censorship by some broadcasters, no serious con-
stitutional problem was implicated because such censorship would affect
only the "form rather than [the] content, of serious communication. 37
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, disagreed with the form-content
distinction of Justice Stevens. He agreed, however, that the FCC order
should be read as an ad hoc determination and preferred to fortify his
position with the expectation that the FCC would proceed cautiously in
the future.38
The members of the majority were again split over the consideration
of the constitutional propriety of the regulation of indecent speech "as
broadcast." Justice Stevens, again writing for himself, Chief Justice
Burger, and Justice Rehnquist, asserted that the regulation of indecent
speech, based on the Court's determination of the value of its content, was
constitutionally permissible. This notion was grounded on the premise
that the regulation of indecent speech is unrelated to the regulation of the
expression of ideas, the latter being clearly beyond the power of
government.39 Again relying on this form-content distinction, Justice
Stevens found that the "social interest in order and morality"40 outweighed
the slight intrinsic value of such speech. Justice Powell, writing for himself
and Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, bolted from this
proposition. He maintained that it was the right of the individual to
determine the value of any particular mode of expression and that any
attempt by the Court to establish a hierarchy of various types of speech for
the purpose of granting more or less first amendment protection was
inappropriate.4'
The plurality section of Justice Stevens' opinion also stressed the
context in which the speech was used. While the assumption that "filthy
words" would be protected in other contexts was accepted arguendo,
Justice Stevens reasoned that in the broadcast context, regulation of the
Carlin monologue was justified.42 Justice Powell agreed with this latter
35. 98 S. Ct. at 3037.
36. Id. at 3032.
37. Id. at 3037 n.18.
38. Id. at 3047.
39. See cases cited at note 135 infra.
40. Id. at 3039 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
41. Id. at 3046.
42. Id. at 3039-40.
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proposition, emphasizing the overriding societal interests implicated by
the broadcast context as opposed to the "value" distinction drawn by
Justice Stevens.43
Justice Stevens, now writing for a majority of the Court, articulated
two overriding justifications for governmental regulation of the Carlin
monologue as indecent speech. The first hinged on what the Court
described as the "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans"
of the broadcast media." The Court sought to protect unsuspecting
listeners from tuning in programs containing indecent speech. Here the
Court emphasized the extent to which radio programs enter the privacy of
the home. The Court asserted even more forcefully the societal interest in
protecting children from such "uniquely accessible" material.45
Justice Brennan, in a fiery dissent, argued that regulation of speech
based on an analysis of the social value of that speech was "completely
antithetical to basic First Amendment values. 46 He also found the interest
of the privacy of adult listeners and the interests of children insufficient to
justify the challenged regulation.47
Finally the Court emphasized the "narrowness" of its holding:
This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver
and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not
decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any
sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.
The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under
which context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a host
of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The
content of the program in which the language is used will also affect the
composition of the audience, and differences between radio television, and
perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant, 8
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. Regulation Based on Value and Harm
Whether the content oriented regulation of indecent speech is
grounded on the Court's judgment regarding the value of that content
(Justice Stevens' view), or on the weight of overriding societal interests
(Justice Powell's view), such regulation must be carefully considered in
light of the fundamental teachings of the first amendment. The basic tenet
of the first amendment is that freedom of speech is a fundamental right and
should be free from governmental interference unless such speech
threatens substantial societal interests or other serious harm.49 The state is
43. Id. at 3047.
44. Id. at 3040.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3047.
47. Id. at 3048.
48. Id. at 3041.
49. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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severely limited in its ability to restrict speech because the free trade of
ideas essential to discovering truth flows naturally from speech itself and is
paramount to the theory of our Constitution."
Admittedly not all speech is subject to full first amendment
protection: fighting words, commercial speech, and obscenity are notable
exceptions. Any consideration of the degree of protection afforded a
particular mode of expression must recognize both the potential harm of
such speech and its value, as measured by its relation to the dissemination
of ideas. The relationship between value and harm can be described in the
following way. When the state can show that a particular regulation will
have little or no effect on the free trade of ideas, -the threshold of harm
necessary to justify such regulation will be comparatively low because the
first amendment seeks to protect the communication of ideas rather than
the mere expression of words.51 When a disjuncture between ideas and
words cannot be proved, the state must show some serious social detriment
or the overriding considerations of some other substantial societal interest
to justify a particular regulation.52 A brief examination of fighting words,
commercial speech, obscenity, and indecent speech-outside the broad-
cast context-will illustrate the operation of these elements.
1. Fighting Words
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire the Court upheld a conviction for
the use of "fighting words."" The Court's definition of fighting words
relied on "what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to rouse an average addressee to fight."54 Included in the
Court's examples were "threatening, profane or obscene revilings." 55 It
may be noted that some of the words used in the Carlin monologue might
fall within the category of words contemplated by 'the Chaplinsky Court.
Nevertheless, the crucial distinguishing feature of the Carlin monologue is
the context of that speech. In Chaplinsky the Court sought to avoid
violence and breaches of the peace provoked by insulting language-
substantial societal harms. The value of such speech was also considered
by the Court. At least with regard to the face to face confrontation in
Chaplinsky, such fighting words were "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas." 6 The judicial gloss placed on the fighting words doctrine since
Chaplinsky must be noted in order to fully appreciate the characterization
of fighting words as having no social value. Under modern interpretation,
50. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 3., dissenting),
51. There is considerable debate, particularly in the area of obscenity, whether social ideas can
be separated from words or images. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. See generally cases cited at notes 49-50 supra.
53. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
54. Id. at 573.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572.
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fighting words are not identifiable as a particular category of words; rather,
they are those words "[having] a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."" A distinc-
tion may be drawn therefore between personal insult, which has little
social value but threatens substantial harm, and social thought.
2. Commercial Speech
First amendment protection of commercial speech has only recently
been recognized. 8 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council the Court acknowledged that commercial
speech implicated the "free flow of information"5 9 and was therefore
socially valuable. Protection of the public from false, deceptive, or
misleading advertising ° was asserted as the basis for the legitimate
regulation of commercial speech. The prevention of economic harm, then,
was the substantial societal interest implicated by the regulation of
commercial speech. In addition, the Court noted what it termed the
"commonsense differences" between commercial speech and other modes
of expression. 6 The Court suggested that these differences formed a basis
for according commercial speech a lesser degree of protection. The notions
encompassing the "commonsense differences" are that (1) the potential
harm of commercial speech can be more easily recognized and more
accurately regulated than potential harm resulting from other modes of
expression, and (2) there is less danger of suppressing the valuable free flow
of information through the regulation of commercial speech because of a
strong economic incentive that encourages advertising regardless of
regulation.
62
The constitutional protection afforded commercial speech has
recently undergone further refinement. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,63
the Court extended the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy Board, used to
approve the advertising of standardized products, to the advertising of64 65
professional legal services. 4 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, a
case concerning in-person solicitation of clients by an attorney, the Court
appeared to shift its emphasis in commercial speech analysis. In Ohralik
the Court began its analysis with the general proposition that commercial
speech has "a subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values," citing the "commonsense differences" developed in Virginia
57. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
618 (1978).
58. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,425 U.S.748 (1976).
59. Id. at 765.
60. Id. at 771.
61. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
62. Id.
63. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
64. Id. at 390-91 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Pharmacy Board as evidence of this proposition 66 While the Court in
Virginia Pharmacy Board did suggest that commercial speech had
diminished value, this characterization appeared as a latent assertion,
Indeed this characterization of commercial speech is inconsistent with the
major thrust of both Virginia Pharmacy Board and Bates, that the free
flow of truthful information is of substantial social value. 7 Both Virginia
Pharmacy Board and Bates indicated that commercial speech may be more
strictly regulated than other forms of speech because potential harm can be
more easily recognized and more accurately regulated, and because the
dangers of suppressing the free flow of truthful information are diminished
in the commercial speech context. These "commonsense differences"
appear to be more closely related to the harm rather than the value of
commercial speech.
While the Court suggested in a footnote in Virginia Pharmacy
Board6" that commercial speech had diminished value, the Court's analysis
in both Virginia Pharmacy Board and Bates demonstrated the substantial
social value of commercial speech. To restate the point, Virginia
Pharmacy Board and Bates recognized the "commonsense differences"
that may legitimately justify a stricter basis for regulating commercial
speech. Such "commonsense differences" did not, however, appear to
substantiate the conclusion that commercial speech was less valuable than
other forms of speech.
What appeared as a latent and perhaps unintended assertion in
Virginia Pharmacy Board became a prominent feature of the Court's
opinion in Ohralik. The Ohralik Court began its analysis with the assertion
that commercial speech is less valuable than other forms of speech and
then examined the harm of the particular speech. This apparent shift in
emphasis in the area of commercial speech was not explained by the
Court.69 Moreover, the consequences of this decrease in value of
66. Id. at 455-56.
67. The Court demonstrated its high regard for commercial speech in Virginia State Bd, of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976), noting that "even If the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal." Similarly, in
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977), the Court urged: "The listener's interest [in
commercial speech] is substantial: The consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often
may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue."
68. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
69. It might be argued that the Court in Ohralik did not regard commercial speech its possessing
diminished social value but merely acknowledged the "commonsense differences" between commercial
speech and other forms. Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion in Ohralik, dispelled tills
notion in Pacifica when he argued:
I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on
the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is most "valuable
and hence deserving of the most protection and which is less "valuable" and hence deserving
of less protection. ...
The Court has, however, created a limited exception to this rule in order to bring
commercial speech within the protection of the First Amendment.
98 S. Ct. at 3046 & n.3.
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commercial speech were not made apparent by the Court's decision. In
Ohralik the state's interests in preventing in-person solicitation of clients
by an attorney were "particularly strong. ' 70 The "substantive evils" flowing
from such solicitations were listed by the Court: "stirring up litigation,
assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching, overcharging,
underrepresentation and misrepresentation.",7' Therefore, the regulation
of commercial speech at issue in Ohralik might have been viewed solely as a
reaction to the serious harm that in-person solicitation can inflict upon the
community and the legal profession, rather than a reflection on the
intrinsic value of commercial speech but for the "diminished value"
72characterization adopted by the Court.
In re Primus, a companion case, serves as an interesting counterpoint
to Ohralik. Primus, an attorney representing the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) had solicited a potential client by letter urging her to allow
ACLU to file suit in her behalf.74 In Primus, however, the Court regarded
the attorney's action as "political expression and association" S and
therefore held it to be protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Primus thus highlights the ambiguity of the Court's assertion in Ohralik
that commercial speech is of lesser value.
3. Obscenity
The Supreme Court's theory of obscenity bears a close relationship to
the considerations found in Pacifica in the sense that both concern
language regarded as "patently offensive, 76 and therefore present similar
analytical problems. Obscenity is not protected by the first amendment
because characteristically it has little or no social value. Under the test of
Miller v. California77 obscenity is identified by determining
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appears to the prurient
interest... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and
70. 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978).
71. Id. at 461.
72. The concept of the "sliding scale" of first amendment values has its origin in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, (1976). In Young a plurality of the Court held that erotic
materials were entitled to lesser first amendment protection because of the lesser value of such
materials. Id. at 70-7I. Ohralik is the first majority decision that clearly adopts this approach to the first
amendment, albeit in the context of commercial speech. The drawbacks of this sliding scale approach
are considered in the text accompanying notes 123-52 infra.
73. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
74. Id. at 416 n.6.
75. fd. at 431.
76. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
77. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.78
Since the three elements of the Miller test are written in the conjunctive,
when a work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest but at the
same time implicates serious social thought, that material is protected and
is not obscene.79 Therefore, in obscenity adjudication a distinction is
drawn between speech that induces psychological excitement resulting
from sexual imagery and speech that communicates social ideas.80 The
threshold of harm that justifies regulation of obscenity is minimal because
obscene material lacks serious social value. Indeed, the precise nature of
the harm inflicted by obscene material has been a matter of continuing
debate.8 '
4. Indecent Speech
The value of indecent speech has been demonstrated by the closeness
of such speech to the communication of ideas. Cohen v. California82 is the
seminal case in this arma. Cohen had been arrested for wearing a jacket,
with the words "fuck the draft" inscribed on the back, in the corridor of the
Los Angeles County Courthouse. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
described the relation of such words to the communication of ideas:
Much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but
otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as
much for their emotive, as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated.83
Justice Harlan concluded that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption
that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial
risk of suppressing ideas in the process. 8 4 The Supreme Court's position in
Cohen, that such words are constitutionally protected, has been firmly
established on numerous occasions and in a variety of contexts.8 5
78. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). Prurience was defined by the Court in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,"
79. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (the film "Carnal Knowledge").
80. While the distinction between sexual imagery and social ideas has been drawn by the Court,
there is considerable debate over the legitimacy of such a distinction. See cases cited at note 51 51q1ra.
81. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-61 (1973).
82. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83. Id. at 26.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130(1974); Hess v. Indiana,414 U.S. 105(1973);
Papish v. University of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson. 405 U.S. 518 (1972),
[Vol. 40:155
INDECENT SPEECH
B. The First Amendment in the Broadcast Context
1. Access to the Media
The broadcast context adds two unique considerations to the issue of
content-based regulation of indecent speech. The first consideration
concerns access to the media. In framing its consideration of the societal
interests involved in Pacifica, the Court alluded to the "special meaning" of
the first amendment in the broadcast context as developed by Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and its progeny.86 Red Lion presented a
challenge to two different aspects of the FCC's fairness doctrine
regulations. The first regulation required that any individual who was the
subject of personal attack over the broadcast medium be given a tape,
manuscript, or summary of the broadcast and be offered reply time.s7 The
second regulation required broadcasters to allow time for reply to political
editorials.88 In affirming the FCC's regulations the Court held,
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in
allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of these unable
without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for
expression of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling of issue here are
both authorized by statute and constitutional.89
Red Lion, therefore, stands for the proposition that governmental
interference into the broadcast media for the purpose of guaranteeing
minority access to the media for the presentation of minority ideas is
justified.90
2. FCC Influence on Regulation
The second consideration goes to the role of the FCC in indecent
speech regulation. The FCC is charged with broad powers with which to
regulate the broadcast industry,9 not the least of which is the power to
make licensing determinations. 2 While licensing determinations are
86. 395 U.S. 367 (1969); See, e.g.. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
87. 395 U.S. at 372.
88. Id. at 374.
89. Id. at 400.
90. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), which
presented a challenge to the refusal of a broadcast licensee to sell broadcasting time to the Democratic
National Committee and to the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace. The issue whether the
action of the broadcasting licensee constituted "government action" for first amendment purposeswas
not definitely answered by a majority of the Court. Nevertheless, in holding in favor of the broadcast
licensee the majority expressed fear that the Court would risk an enlarged control over the content or
public broadcasts by the government if it held otherwise. Id. at 126-27.
91. Eg., 47 U.S.C. § (1970) (section 303(g) is quoted in note 21 supra).
92. Much of the FCC's power over broadcasters is derived from the licensing process. All radio
broadcasters are required to be licensed by the FCC [47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)] and licenses must be
renewed every three years [47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970)]. Moreover, the FCC discretionary powers over
licensing have become broad through both legislative fiat and judicial gloss. In brief, these powers
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subject to judicial review,93 it may be difficult for a disappointed
broadcaster to prevail in court because of the inherent vagueness of the
licensing standards. 94 Therefore, both the range of powers of the
Commission and the attitude of the FCC toward indecent speech have a
significant practical impact on the tenor of indecent speech regulation.
Several examples will serve to illustrate the historical attitude of the FCC
toward indecent speech 95 and the types of materials previously considered
by the FCC.
In 1964 the Commission considered applications for license renewals
for several stations owned by the Pacifica Foundation" in light of several
complaints to the Commission about the airing of five "provocative"
programs over a four-year period. Four of the programs were broadcasts
of contemporary American literary material-poems of Lawrence
Ferlinghetti and others, a play, and part of a novel-read by the respective
authors. The four programs contained "a few offensive words"9 7 and
"certain minor swear words." 9 The fifth program hosted eight homosex-
uals who discussed their attitudes and problems. The license renewals were
granted, but subsequently limited to one year's duration rather than the
normal three, for the failure of Pacifica "to conform to its stated
supervisory policies." 99 Consideration of the station's supervisory powers
was in this case determinative of whether the station was operating in the
"public interest."' °
In Jack Frost Memorial Foundation'0 the Commission was faced
with complaints of the alleged use of "profane, indecent or obscene
language"'0 2 by KRAB-FM. The FCC initially determined that the
station's license should only be renewed for one year, although the FCC
require the FCC to make licensing determinations in pursuance of the "public interest, convenienece,
and necessity," 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1970), criteria that are "as concrete as the complicated factors for
judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit," National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943), for the purpose of providing "a fair, efficient and equitable distribution of
radio service [to the several states and communities]," 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970). See FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970).
94. See authorities cited at note 107 infra; see generally FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
95. See also Sonderling Corp., 27 P. & F. RADIo REG. 2d 285, reconsideration denied, 41
F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), reconsideration denied, 34 F.C.C.
101 (1963), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 843 (1964); Mile High Stations Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960).
96. Pacifica Foundation, I P. & F. RADIO REG. 2d 747 (1964).
97.. Id. at 751.
98. Id. at 750.
99. Pacifica Foundation, 6 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2d 570, 571 (1965).
100. See note 92 supra.
101. 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970), hearing ordered on reconsideration, 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970),
hearing on motion to clarify and enlarge issues, 26 F.C.C.2d 97 (1970), license renewed, 29 F.C.C.2d
334 (1971).
102. 21 F.C.C.2d at 833.
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never saw a transcript of the controversial broadcasts and had no
information about the context of the speech used.10 3 The Commission
reasoned that it need not apply the indecency statute1°4 to the offending
language, but had only to address the failure of the station to follow its
stated policies. Subsequently, motions for rehearing and enlargement of
the issues were granted10 5 in which the station had the burden of proving
that its overall programming was in the "public interest" and that it was
entitled to a full three-year license renewal. 0 6 Although the station
ultimately prevailed, this case not only illustrates the ease with which the
indecent language issue was circumvented, but also demonstrates the
potential in terrorem effect that the Commission's procedures may have on
broadcasters generally.1
0 7
The much-discussed case of Eastern Educational Radio'0 s concerned
an hour-long tape recorded interview with Jerry Garcia, a member of the
"Grateful Dead," a rock and roll music group. Garcia discussed his views
on various social issues, interjecting what the commission termed
"gratuitous"'0 9 four letter words." 0 The interview was essentially an
expression of the views of the counterculture of the Vietnam era. In
imposing a one hundred dollar forfeiture on the station the Commission
maintained that it had "a duty to act to prevent the widespread use on
broadcast outlets of such expressions . . ... "' and that the use of
indecent language [could] be avoided on radio with stifling in the
slightest any thought which the person wish[ed] to convey."" t2 The
Commission's test of indecency was adapted from the then current
obscenity standard of Roth-Memoirs. " The Commission found that "the
103. Id. at 834.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). The text is set out in note 21 supra.
105. See note 101 supra.
106. 26 F.C.C.2d at 99.
107. Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has dubbed the experience of KRAB-FM as" 'raised eyebrow' harassment." Illinois Citizen's
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397,417 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("statement of Judge Bazelon
as to why he voted to grant rehearing en band"). To ensure compliance with its programming policies
the Commission relies on the initial licensing and licensing renewal process. See note 92 supra. To
produce desired programming changes the Commission may rely on such procedures as scheduling a
hearing for license renewal instead of renewing a license pro forma. Alternatively, the Commission
might send a letter of inquiry to the station or make a telephone call to thestation owner orhis attorney.
The role of the FCC in the area of program content control has been questioned by several
commentators on first amendment grounds. Their discussions serve to highlight the informal
procedures by which the FCC exerts pressure on licensees without having to rely on formal
mechanisms. Kalvin, supra note 21, at 21; Robinson, supra note 21, at 121-27; Note, Regulation of
Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARv. L. REv. 701, 703 (1964).
108. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
109. Id. at 413.




113. In Roth the Court asked "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
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speech involved [had] no redeteming social value, and 'was' patently
offensive by contemporary community standards, with very serious
consequences to the 'public interest in the larger and more effective use of
radio' (section 303 (g)).,,1t 4 This case provided the major framework for the
consideration of the Carlin monologue.
In sum, the FCC has historically taken a strong stance against the use
of indecent speech in broadcast. At times the FCC has exhibited an
overzealous attitude that has resulted in a compromise of first amendment
values.' 1
5
The FCC's position on derogatory racial and ethnic speech
demonstrates a marked contrast in attitude. United Federation of
Teachers1 6 concerned the airing of an antisemitic poem 17 on a program
investigating racism and the relations between "Negroes and Jews." ' The
poem was read to expose the listeners to "this element of opinion in the
black community.'" 9 The FCC's consideration of this matter can be
summarized as follows:
We recognize that media critics and others have asserted that while it is
desirable for broadcasters to focus on the problem, there is no need to do so
by permitting "sensational" statements such as here involved. . . . While
there may well be substance to such criticism this is not a matter appropriate
for this agency. 12
0
Similarly, in Julian Bond12 1 the FCC determined that it could not prohibit
the use of the word "nigger" by a political candidate in his announcements
over a broadcast station.12 2 The FCC has shown great concern over the use
interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). In Memoirs the Court added,
Under this definition . . . three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
114. 24 F.C.C.2d at 410.
115. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 556 F.2d 9,21 (1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring), rev'd, 98
S. Ct. 3026 (1978). "Several years ago, I felt compelled to write that 'the FCC has demonstrated what
one can most charitably describe as a total ignorance of the constitutional definition of
obscenity.' . . . Unfortunately, this case would seem to confirm that view."
116. 17 F.C.C.2d 204 (1969).
117. The poem began,
Hey, Jewboy, with that yamulka on your head
you pale faced Jewboy-I wish you were dead
I can see you Jewboy-no you can't hide
I got a scoop on you-yea, you gonna die . ...
Id. at 204-05.
118. Id. at 206.
119. Id. at 205.
120. Id. at 209.
121. 43 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2d. 1015 (1978).
122. Id. at 1015. See also Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C,
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
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of sex-based speech but little concern for the use of racial or ethnic speech.
The foregoing discussion has identified two central aspects of
regulation of indecent speech in the broadcast context: justification and
scope of regulation. The concepts of value and harm form the theoretical
framework used to justify the regulation of indecent speech; the scope of
that regulation is closely tied to the broad statutory powers of the FCC.
III. ANALYSIS OF Pacifica
A. The Value of Indecent Speech
Justice Stevens, in the plurality portion of his opinion, indicated that
regulation of indecent speech will affect only the form rather than the
content of the message communicated and that such speech has
comparatively less value than other forms of communication.'2 Justice
Stevens recognized, however, that in some contexts the use of indecent
speech must be protected. ' 24 This "sliding scale" approach to the first
amendment traces its origin to the plurality opinion of Justice Stevens in
Young v. American Mini Theatres.'25 This approach uses the following
analytical process. To decide whether particular speech will be protected,
an initial inquiry is made to deteimine if that speech falls into a general
category of speech that has less value. If the speech in question is within a
less valuable category, a second inquiry is made to determine the value of
the speech with reference to the particular context in which the speech is
used.
126
Justice Stevens characterized indecent speech ("patently offensive
words dealing with sex and excretion")127 by noting that "such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and "ordinarily lack
literary, political or scientific value."' 2 8 If this characterization is accurate,
then why should such speech be protected in any context? Under obscenity
analysis, if speech appeals only to the prurient interest and does not
constitute a serious attempt to communicate social ideas it is unprotected
in all contexts.
129
By acknowledging the vitality of indecent speech in some contexts
123. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
124. Id.
125. 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see note 72 supra.
126. FCC v. Pacifica foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3037-39.
127. Id. at 3038.
128. Id. at 3039.
129. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
explained:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the guarantees [of the First Amendment]. . . .But implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the Court reaffirmed the notion that obscenity is unprotected
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Justice Stevens implicitly recognized the inseverable link of indecent
speech to the communication of ideas. How then may it be said that
indecent speech in the abstract is of little value? To force Carlin to
broadcast his message, that societal attitudes toward these forbidden
words are "essentially silly," without using the words themselves, is to
disregard the "emotive function"'3 of that message. The transcript of the
Carlin monologue found in the appendix to the case 131 illustrates that at
numerous points the monologue was interrupted by audience laughter, a
clear indication that Carlin had communicated his message. For the
comedian Carlin, the precise composition of his monologue was
undoubtedly part and parcel of the ideological message conveyed.
The risk of suppressing indecent speech has been aptly summarized by
one commentator:
This new view of the protection due offensive language is of special
importance to dissident groups in American society. Offensive words are
most often used in public by members of groups whose divergence from the
traditional American life style includes social, political, philosophical,
cultural, and linguistic differences. It is not coincidental that the litigants in
Cohen, Gooding, Rosenfield, Lewis, Brown, and Papish were all members of
such groups. To allow enforcing authorities who are often the object of this
offensive language to suppress it simply because partisans of the dominant life
style find it distasteful is to censor the vital ideological and emotional content
of dissidents' expression.132
To the extent that Carlin's method and message do not comport with
mainstream American notions, his expression may properly be considered
dissident. Justice Stevens implicitly acknowledged the value of Carlin's
speech by recognizing that the Carlin monologue would be protected
speech in some contexts. 133 Therefore, to say that the speech used in the
Carlin monologue is less valuable than some other expression is to say a
fortiori that Carlin's message is less valuable than some other message.134
At the very heart of the first amendment is the right of the individual to
determine the value of ideological expression; the state is precluded from
speech. The Miller Court, however, amended the element of the obscenity test that required a finding of
"utterly without redeeming social importance" to a determination ofwhether the work taken as a whole
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at 24. See also text accompanying note 78
supra.
130. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
131. 98 S. Ct. at 3041.
132. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evaluation of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 (1974); See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is Therea Right Not to Be Spoken to?,
67 Nw. U.L. REV. 153, 191-92 (1972).
133. 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
134. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 82-85
supra. "[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Id. at 26; Haiman, supra note 132, at
189: "For example, it can hardly be maintained that phrases like, 'Repeal the Draft,"Rcsist the Draft,'
or 'The Draft Must Go' convey essentially the same message as 'Fuck the Draft.' Clearly something is
lost in the translation."
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making such determinations. 35 Under Justice Stevens' approach an
orthodoxy of particular ideas is being prescribed.
The second aspect of Justice Stevens' approach also creates
confusion. After it is assumed that indecent speech generally is less
valuable, the context of the speech is examined to determine the value of
the speech in that context and therefore to assess whether the speech
deserves protection. 3 6 Justice Stevens assumed arguendo that the Carlin
monologue is protected in other contexts. 37 By implication, in the
broadcast context the value of Carlin's monologue is diminished. How can
it be said that Carlin's message is less valuable when aired on a program
discussing societal attitudes toward language than when aired in the
concert hall or in record form? Could it be said that Cohen's clearly
political message, in Cohen v. California, 138 would have had less value had
it been aired over radio rather than displayed on the back of his jacket? The
decisive factor in these cases is the potential harm of the speech, not the
value of the speech in a particular context. The value of the speech is
necessarily a subjective determination that may change with the length of
the Justices' feet. The proof of this subjectivity is found in the test of value
offered by Justice Stevens--"vulgar, offensive, and shocking."139 The
important question is, vulgar, offensive, and shocking to whom? Even
Justice Stevens candidly admitted that "the fact society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.' 40 The concept of
value therefore adds more confusion than clarity to the analysis of indecent
speech because of its elusive nature.
The difficulties of making value determinations have been aptly
demonstrated by the Court's obscenity decisions. Indeed, Justice Stewart's
frustrated "I know it when I see it' 4' approach was a manifestation of
these difficulties. Under the Court's obscenity approach the distinctions
that must be drawn are simpler than the distinctions found in Justice
Stevens' indecent speech approach. In obscenity adjudication the Court
must essentially decide whether a work has diminished value or not.
42
135. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
137. Id.
138. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
139. 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
140. Id. at 3038.
141. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
142. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra; cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
and Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)
(Obscenity determinations are not always made by assessing the value of the material in the abstract.
The context in which the material is found may influence the finding of obscenity ifthe material is sold
to minors, appeals to sexual deviants, or is pandered.). But cf, Splawn v. California, 431 U.S.595,603
n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens would have overruled Ginzburgin light of rrglnia
Pharmacy Board because of the social significance of the free flow oftruthful information. Had Justice
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Under Justice Stevens' approach the Court is faced with distinguishing
between the value of speech in different contexts.
Although this "sliding scale" value approach of Justice Stevens
represents only the views of three Justices in Pactfica,'43 its importance
should not be underestimated. A full majority of the Court has accepted
this approach in the context of commercial speech. In that context the
approach appears vulnerable to the same criticisms as in indecent speech.
The Court in Ohralik characterized commercial speech as having a
"subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."'44 Yet the
Court's opinion was aimed at demonstrating the potential harm of in-
person solicitation of clients by an attorney for pecuniary gain. In contrast,
the Court's decision in Primus,145 a companion case to Ohralik, avoided
the mention of the "subordinate value" of commercial speech. In Primus
the Court characterized the solicitation by letter of a client by an ACLU
lawyer as "political expression and association"'146 rather than commercial
speech, to avoid the potential effects of the "subordinate value"
proposition. While Ohralik and Primus may be distinguished because of
the potential pecuniary gain of the attorney in Ohralik, such a distinction is
not a reliable basis for distinguishing between the value of the speech in
Ohralik and the value of the speech in Primus. Indeed, the solicitation in
Ohralik is potentially as valuable as the solicitation in Primus if such
solicitation promotes the free flow of truthful information. 147 Therefore,
the "sliding scale" value approach to the first amendment as applied to
commercial speech produces several unfortunate consequences. First, it
leads to difficult distinctions based on "the motive of the speaker and the
character of the expressive activity."'148 Second, it creates an exception to
the principle that the value of speech "is a judgment for each person to
make, not one for the judge to impose upon him."" 9 Last, this approach
serves to obfuscate the central basis for distinguishing between cases. That
central basis is the potential harm of speech in a particular context. Thus,
the results in Ohralik and Primus can be easily reconciled by focusing on
the "particularly strong"'' 50 state interests threatened by Ohralik that
remained unthreatened in Primus.
Similarly, what appears to be at the heart of Justice Stevens' opinion
Stevens' view been adopted by the Court, obscenity analysis would have been simplified by removing a
significant context variable.).
143. Id. at 3037-39.
144. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456(1978). See text accompanying notes 58-
75 supra.
145. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
146. Id. at 431.
147. See text accompanying notes 58-75 supra. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977).
148. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
149. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3047.
150. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 460.
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in Pacifica is the issue of the harm of indecent speech rather than the value
of such speech. It was the analysis of the harm of the Carlin monologue as
manifested by the privacy interest of adults and the interests of children
that gained the acceptance of a majority of the Court.15 ' In order to unravel
the confusion created by these recent cases the Court must return to basic
first amendment analysis. Basic first amendment analysis focuses on the
harm of the speech and leaves subjective value determinations to the
individual. 152
Before turning to the harm implicated by the Carlin monologue in
the broadcast context, it is necessary to consider one preliminary mat-
ter. That matter deals with the appropriate impact of the Red Lion 53
doctrine that "the first amendment has special meaning in the broad-
cast context."'154 Before its analysis of the societal interests at issue in
Pacifica, the majority alluded to the "special meaning" doctrine of Red
Lion and its progeny, 155 implying that Red Lion lends support to the
content regulation sanctioned in Pacifica. The most striking difference
between Red Lion and Pacifica is that in Red Lion the Court sanctioned
governmental interference into the broadcast media for the purpose of
guaranteeing minority access to the media.15 6 Pacifica, by contrast, placed
the government in the role of censor displacing minority views from the
radio. While Red Lion and its progeny do indicate that the broadcast
medium presents unique first amendment problems, none of the unique
aspects of broadcast considered in those cases supports governmental
censorship of speech integrally related to social or political thought.'
5 7
Indeed, in Red Lion the Court noted, "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by government itself or a private licensee." 58
The principles of Red Lion should not, therefore, be extended to content
regulation that proscribes speech.
The interjection of the "sliding scale" value approach and the "special
meaning" doctrine serve only to cloud the crucial issue in Pacifica. That
issue, the potential harm of indecent speech in the broadcast context,
151. 98 S. Ct. at 3043 (Powell, J., concurring).
152. See cases cited at note 135 supra.
153. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969).
154. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. CL at 3036 n.17. See text accompanying notes 86-90
supra.
155. See cases cited at note 86 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
157. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub non.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (upholding prohibition of
cigarette advertising in broadcast media). This decision rested on an earlier notion, since overruled.
that commercial speech was generally beyond the protection of the first amendment. See generally
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
158. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
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requires consideration of the privacy interests of unwilling adult listeners
and the interests of children who may be present in the broadcast audience.
B. Social Harm
1. Protecting the Privacy Interest of
Unwilling Adult Listeners
The first of two social interests asserted by the Court to justify the
regulation of speech in Pacifica was the right of unwilling adult listeners to
privacy in their homes.' 59 The interest in the home, the Court maintained,
was implicated because of the "uniquely pervasive presence [of the
broadcast media] in the lives of all Americans."1 60 Faced with the
argument that the privacy interests of unwilling adults were insignificant
because of the ease with which offended listeners might either have
changed the dial or refrained from tuning into the program in the first
instance,16 the court responded:
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for assault is to run
away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that
option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid the harm
that has already taken place.
62
To demonstrate the weight of the privacy interests in the home compared
to the first amendment rights of an "intruder" the Court cited Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department. 1 63 Rowan, however, left the choice
of censorship to the individual addressee. The Court clearly distinguished
the case of a governmental official determining the propriety of sending
different types of material through the mail.164 The Court had considered
similar matters in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.165 In Hannegan the Court
prohibited the use of the postal power by the Postmaster General to
regulate the mailing of material that was not fraudulent or obscene. 166 In
these cases the acceptance or rejection of the material was left to the
discretion of the individual.
Of particular interest in assessing the privacy interest of unwilling
adult listeners is Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.67 In Erznoznik, an
ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from exhibiting films
159. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3048-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 3040.
163. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The case presented a challenge by the operators of mail order houses to
the constitutionality of a federal postal statute under which a householder could require that his name
be removed from mailing lists and that all future mailings to him be halted. d. at 729.
164. Id. at 737.
165. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
166. Id. at 155-56.
167. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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containing nudity if the movie screen was visible from a public street was
held to be illegal content-based discrimination because the ordinance did
not cover other types of potentially offensive subjects as well. In defense of
the ordinance, the city raised the issue of the privacy interest of unwilling
adults. The Court, through Justice Powell, rejected this justification for the
ordinance, noting that absent a clear invasion of privacy in the home or
circumstances making it impractical for an offended viewer to avoid
exposure, the offended viewer must avert his eyes.168 It may be argued that
Erznoznik and Pacifica are distinguishable because the former dealt with
an offense to the sensibilities of the viewer in a public place whereas the
latter implicated privacy in the home. This is a distinction without a
difference. Radio broadcasts do not invade the privacy of the home.
Indeed, the potential listener invites the "public" into his home by
voluntarily turning on the radio. Moreover, the offended listener is better
able to protect his sensibilities than the unwilling viewer in the public
street. In Erznoznik, as in Cohen,169 the offended viewer was relegated to
the remedies of averting his eyes or leaving the scene. The offended
broadcast listener suffers no such inconvenience or discomfort. He may
simply turn off the radio program and be done with it. As Justice Brennan
in his dissenting opinion in Pacifica aptly stated:
Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his home to radio com-
munications retains privacy interests of such moment to justify a ban on
protected speech if those interests are "invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner," the very fact that those interests are threatened only by a radio
broadcast precludes any intolerable invasion of privacy; for unlike other
intrusive modes of communication, such as sound trucks,"[t]he radio can be
turned off," -and with a minimum of effort.170
By allowing a governmental agency to determine that nonobscene
speech may constitutionally be kept from the entire listening public,
willing and unwilling alike, in order to protect unwilling listeners, the
Pacifica Court has extended the privacy interest beyond the bounds
previously recognized. It is not clear that the Court has considered the
plethora of implications arising from this decision.
An issue of immediate significance is the potential treatment of
derogatory racial and ethnic speech in the broadcast context. The issue has
been raised17 ' and clearly must be resolved by the Court in light of its
decision in Pacifica. Certainly a cogent argument can be made that
derogatory racial and ethnic terms are as harmful, offensive, and intrusive
in the broadcast context as the sexual and excretory terms of the Carlin
monologue, perhaps more so. Moreover, it is clear that no logical
distinction can be drawn between derogatory racial and ethnic terms and
168. Id. at 212.
169. 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
170. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (citations omitted).
171. See text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
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indecent speech. Does it not, therefore, seem curious that the FCC has
been reluctant to promulgate regulations to restrict the use of derogatory
racial and ethnic terms? 72 The anomaly of the Commission's position is
explained by the very same considerations developed earlier. The
Commission's decision not to regulate the use of derogatory ethnic and
racial terms can only be viewed as a subjective determination based on its
members' perception of the value of racial and ethnic speech. Undoubted-
ly, the FCC perceives ethnic and racial speech to be more closely tied than
indecent speech to political ideas. Surely Cohen v. California 73 and the
interpretation of the Carlin monologue demonstrated earlier1 74 illustrate
the fallacy of the Commission's view. Moreover, banning derogatory
racial and ethnic terms will not cure the inconsistencies inherent in the
Commission's position, for then the FCC and the Court must face yet
other categories of speech deemed to be offensive and intrusive by some
individuals. Some individuals are deeply offended by certain religious
programming, others by the idiocy of certain media advertisements. By
banning any type of speech related to the communication of social ideas
the FCC and the Court are necessarily placing the interests of one segment
of the population above the interests of another. 175 The regulation of this
expanding group of categories of speech must necessarily result in either
the relegation of the listening public to the uniformly inoffensive and bland
or continued differentiation based on the subjective inclinations of the
regulating body. Both results clearly deprive the broadcast industry of first
amendment protection.176 What has been implicitly demonstrated by the
foregoing analysis is that the harm of indecent speech to the offended adult
listener is no greater than that which various segments of the listening
public currently must endure.
It should not be inferred from the foregoing discussion that the
Pacifica Court completely foreclosed radio broadcast of indecent speech;
the Court stressed that its holding was narrow. 77 Nevertheless, difficulties
persist. The categories of regulated speech cannot be narrowly cir-
172. Id.
173. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
174. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3048 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Eastern Educ,
Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 108-14supra text accompanying
notes 132-42 supra.
175. See Haiman, supra note 132, at 191-92.
Deference is being paid to the sensibilities and privacy claims of the prevalent groups in
society who happen to find ... certain kinds of words deeply repulsive, while no
comparable concern is shown for minorities who may have no "hang-ups" about those
particular kinds of communication, but who may be just as deeply offended by different
verbal and visual stimuli which few would seriously propose to exclude ....
176. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3048-49 (Brennan.J., dissenting); Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949): "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." See also cases cited at note 135
supra.
177. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3040-41 n.28.
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cumscribed. Moreover, the privacy interest that the Court used to justify
limited regulation in Pacifica logically extends the scope of regulation
beyond the narrow bounds approved by the Court.
1 78
By analogizing the interests of unwilling adult listeners in Pacifica to
the interests of those subjected to "indecent phone call[s]" and
"assault[s]"'179 the Court implicitly suggested that its concern was aimed at
the initial shock suffered by offended listeners, the shock that occurs in the
brief interval between the time the words are first heard and the time the
dial is changed. Prior warnings do not sufficiently protect offended
listeners, the Court maintained, because "the broadcast audience is
constantly tuning in and out."'180 If the privacy interest, as manifested by
the prevention of initial shock, is the interest that the Court sought to
protect, it is unclear how the "host of variables," such as "the time of day"
or the "context of the program in which the language is used,"'' may be
used to limit effectively the scope of regulation of indecent speech in the
broadcast context. How can the privacy interest of the offended adult
listener who tunes in at 2:00 p.m. be distinguished from the privacy interest
of the offended adult listener who tunes in at 1:00 a.m.? When only a few
words may offend in the seconds required to change the dial, what
difference does it make to the offended listener whether the offensive words
are the only such words in the entire program or merely a small sample of
what is yet to come? In sum, recognition of the privacy interest of unwilling
adult listeners leaves both the selection of the categories of speech subject
to regulation and the scope of regulation to the subjective inclinations of
the regulating body.
2. The Presence of Children in the Listening Audience
The critical question in Pacifica, the "bottom line," is the social
interest in protecting children from the adverse effects of indecent speech.
It was this interest that was of primary concern to the FCC when it
instituted its action against Pacifica Foundation'8 2 and it was this interest
that was obscured by the discussion of the intrinsic value of indecent
speech,183 and the special meaning of the first amendment in the broadcast
context, 84 and the interest of adults in the privacy of the home."53 The
majority maintained that regulation of indecent speech in the broadcast
context was justified because the material was uniquely accessible to
178. Id. at 3041, quoted in text accompanying note 48 supra.
179. Id. at 3040, quoted in text accompanying note 162 supra.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3041.
182. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976), rerld, 556 F.2d 9 (1977),
rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
183. See text accompanying notes 123-52 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 153-58 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 159-81 supra.
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children, that is, the dissemination of indecent programming to willing
adult listeners could not be accomplished without affecting the interests of
children because unsupervised children are able to tune in to indecent
programming. 8 6 The unique accessibility of the broadcast media to
children is irrelevant, however, if the harm to children is insufficient to
justify the regulation of speech. The legitimate right of the state "to adopt
more stringent controls on communicative material" in order to protect
children is firmly established. 8 7 The potential harm to children in this case,
however, is not serious enough to justify the pervasive regulation 188 of
indecent speech that will necessarily flow from the Court's decision. Both
Justice Stevens and Justice Powell acknowledged the existence of harm to
children but neither clearly articulated its dimensions. Justice Stevens
noted that "Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary
in an instant."'8 9 Justice Powell maintained "that such speech may have a
deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child than an adult," and
"[t]he language involved in this case [was] as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as representations of many erotic acts."' 90 The
problem with these assertions is that they appear in the case as mere
conclusions, unsupported by citation to scientific or other authority.
Therefore, while the essence of the Court's decision rested on a
determination that serious harm sufficient to outweigh first amendment
considerations existed, no indication was given regarding the basis for that
determination.
Juxtaposed against the Court's conclusion are two indicators that
raise serious doubts about the validity of that conclusion. Cohen v.
California'9' stands in bold relief. In the report of the facts of Cohen it was
noted that "women and children" were present in the corridor of the Los
Angeles County Courthouse when Cohen exposed the message on his
jacket. 92 Yet no mention of this fact is found in the Cohen majority
opinion. It is difficult to understand how an interest of such strong
proportions in Pacifica warranted not a single reference in Cohen.
Recalling that Justice Stevens implicitly recognized the continuing vitality
of cases like Cohen'93 it is unclear why the interests of "women and
children" in Cohen are less pressing than the interests of the children in
Pacifica. The various academic studies cited by Justice Brennan in his
dissent also tend to undermine the majority's conclusion. These studies
186. 98 S. Ct. at 3045 (Powell, J., concurring).
187. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); see cases cited in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 3044.
188. See text accompanying notes 198-207 infra.
189. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
190. Id. at 3045.
191. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
192. Id. at 16.
193. 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
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show that in certain subcultures of our society, not only are such words as
Carlin used in his monologue considered inoffensive, but they may be "the
stuff of everyday conversations.' 94 The proof that children are adversely
affected by indecent speech is, therefore, less than conclusive.
In this light, the Court's opinion must be seen as prescribing an
orthodoxy of particular ideas for children. Not only does such a
prescription violate the right of parents to raise their children as they see
fit,' 95 but it violates the substantial first amendment rights of children as
well. In this latter respect the Court's opinion in Pacifica runs counter to
Erznoznik 96 in which the Court recognized that
speech that is neither obscene as to youths or subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most
circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to
minors.'9
The protection of children does not appear to necessitate the pervasive
regulation of speech implicitly approved by the Court in Pacifica.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF Pacifica
A. Chilling Effect
One of the major constitutional issues raised by Pacifica Foundation
was overbreadth. Pacifica claimed and the court of appeals agreed that
the Commission's indecency standard was "massively overbroad."'"' Both
Justice Stevens and Justice Powell circumvented the consideration of
overbreadth by reading the FCC order narrowly as an ad hoc
determination "issued in a specific factual context."' 99
While the Court may have avoided the overbreadth argument, a grave
potential for pervasive regulation and the chilling of protected speech
nonetheless exists. This potential arises from several sources. First, and of
foremost concern, is the Commission's strong tendency to overregulate the
use of indecent speech. 200 The restrictive test developed by the FCC in
Pacifica under which the number of children in the listening audience is
"reduced to a minimum"W20 ' aptly demonstrates the Commission's attitude.
Indeed, two of the Commissioners would have banned the use of indecent
194. Id. at 3054.
195. 98 S. Ct. at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
196. 422 U.S. 205 (1975); see text accompanying note 166 supra.
197. Id. at 213-14 (footnotes omitted).
198. 556 F.2d 9, 21 (1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
199. 98 S. Ct. at 3037. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 96-115 supra.
201. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98(1975), clarified, 59 F.C.C.2d 892(1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (1977), rer'd.
98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978). See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
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speech from the radio under all circumstances.0 2 Even the Commission's
legislative proposals that Justice Powell apparently considered to be
evidence of FCC "caution" in the area20 3 exhibit a vigorous tendency
toward regulation without clearly defined bounds of protected use of
indecent speech.20 4 The second source is the ability of the FCC to carry out
its aims notwithstanding the potential for appellate court review. Its broad
delegated power to regulate in the "public interest" gives the FCC great
discretion, particularly in the area of licensing determinations. 20' While a
broadcaster might eventually prevail in court, the cost of enduring "raised
eyebrow harassment, 20 6 a continuous threat because of the license
renewal process, creates a strong incentive to stay on the Commission's
"good side."
In light of these realities, the failure of the Court to establish
principled limits on the Commission's power must be seen as an implicit
approval of pervasive regulation of indecent speech in the broadcast
context. Certainly, protection of the privacy interest of unwilling adult
listeners, as recognized by the Court in Pacifica, necessitates pervasive
regulation and therefore lends support to this view.20 7
The Commission is motivated in large part by a fear that without its
strict supervision the use of indecent language over the radio will become
rampant.20 8 Even if widespread use of indecent language over the radio is
socially undesirable there is no reason to fear that without FCC control
such a result would be forthcoming. In a very real sense the marketplace
recognized by Justice Holmes209 appears to be competent to evaluate
202. 56 F.C.C.2d at 102-03. Discussed in text accompanying note 12 supra.
203. 98 S. Ct. at 3047 n.4.
204. 122 CONG. REc. S17,101 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (FCC legislative proposals and
comments). The FCC demonstrated its attitude toward indecent speech in the following manner: "The
Commission acknowledges that this is an area of considerable legal uncertainty. However, it has a
strong interest in controlling morally offensive material which is less than obscene and believes that it is
compelled to act in this area despite the uncertainties." Id. at S17,106. In its recommendations the
Commission contemplated that protecting unwilling adult listeners and children under the age of 12
requires broadcasters to avoid "sensational techniques" and require,, broadcasting of programs
containing indecent language to be restricted to the hours between II p.m. and 7 a.m. "weekdays," Id.
at S17,106 nn. 120-21. The FCC in redefining the indecency standard concluded that " 'indecent
material' means a representation or verbal description of a human sexual or excretory organ or
function, which under contemporary community standards for radio communication or cable
television is patently offensive." Id. at S17,101. The explanation of this definition highlighted its
ambiguities:
This standard is based upon the premise that these media are distinctive and therefore that a
number of factors should be considered in making these judgments: The means of the
communication employed, the nature and composition of the audience reached, the time of
dissemination, and the length and frequency of the objectionable material. The proposed
definition leaves to the Courts the question of whether this consideration should be based on
local, or state or national standards and how and by whom it should be applied,
Id. at S17,106 (footnote omitted).
205. See note 92 supra.
206. See note 107 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 177-81 supra.
208. See text accompanying notes Ill & 204 supra.
209. See cases cited at note 135 supra.
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indecent speech. There is a significant economic disincentive that would
limit widespread use of indecent speech over the radio. If people are
offended by such language they will undoubtedly refrain from listening to
stations that broadcast such language or will change the dial. Advertisers
who are concerned with the widest public exposure for their advertising
will be less likely to sponsor programs that suffer from a reduction in the
number of listeners or enrage the public. Similarly, educational or
philanthropic organizations are less likely to want their names associated
with programming that evokes public ire.210 The market, therefore, would
appear to be competent to check programming abuses.
By tacitly approving pervasive regulation of indecent speech in the
broadcast context, the Court has "violate[d] in spades the principle of
Butler v. Michigan."21 ' The Court has reduced the content of radio
communication to that which is fit only for children, or as Justice Brennan
observed, to that "which may not be constitutionally kept even from
children., 212 The Court has created a grave potential for the censorship of
socially valuable communication by the FCC and by broadcasters who
fear FCC sanctions.
B. An Alternative Approach
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the difficulties associated
with determining the intrinsic value of any category of speech. Any
determination based on the value of individual words used to express an
idea is necessarily an evaluation of that idea. As Cohen and its progeny
3
illustrate, indecent speech is often used to convey a message of political
protest. While the Carlin monologue was not necessarily a statement of
protest, it was an opinion on societal attitudes toward language,214 and
therefore a social opinion. The decision in Pacifica aptly demonstrates the
risk that regulation will erode the principles of the first amendment.
The regulation of indecent speech must generally be regarded as
inappropriate but a narrow exception might be fashioned for programs
containing indecent speech, "directed specifically at younger children.
215
According to Justice Brennan, this narrow regulation might constitute one
of the "other legitimate proscriptions" alluded to in Erznoznik216 because
young children "are not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of the first amendment guarantees."
217
210. See generally Georgetown Univ., 66 F.C.C.2d 944 (1977).
211. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
212. 98 S. Ct. at 3050.
213. 'See notes 82 & 85 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
215. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See text accompanying notes 197 & 167 supra.
217. 98 S. CL at 3050 n.3 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,649-50 (1968) (Stewart,
J., concurring)).
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The harm of indecent speech outweighs the value of such speech under this
approach if one hypothesizes that young children are incapable of
understanding the social message that the words are meant to convey and
can thus derive no value from indecent speech. 'While this alternative
approach incorporates the concept of value, a concept that has been
criticized throughout this paper,21 8 the limited use of the concept in this
setting is far different from the use of the concept in the approach of Justice
Stevens. Under this alternative approach the concept of value is linked to a
single basic assumption. This assumption, the inability of young children
to perceive certain ideas regardless of the language used to express them, is
well based in human experience.219 Justice Stevens' approach requires
assumptions that are far more complex. These assumptions relate to the
intrinsic characteristics of certain words and the fluctuation of those
characteristics that results from a change in context.220
This alternative approach might serve as a practical alternative to the
Court's approach when considered in light of the facts of a particular case.
While the approach is far more protective of free speech in theory, it may
be subject to practical abuses. These abuses might result from the difficulty
of determining audience composition or the age at which children begin to
perceive the social significance of certain ideas. Moreover, this approach
evinces only guarded confidence in the power of the marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Emerging from Pacifica are various difficulties that threaten
the vitality of the first amendment. The most serious threat comes from
Justice Stevens' application of a "sliding scale" of values to the first
amendment. 221 This approach, which appears to be gaining in popularity
222among the members of the Court, poses serious analytical problems.
Under this approach, certain categories of speech are said to have less
value than others; within a suspect category the value of speech fluctuates
from one context to the next. This approach is subject to one major
criticism, that no objective method of valuation has been offered with
which to distinguish between categories and contexts. The test therefore
threatens the censorship of the communication of ideas that is prohibited
by the first amendment.
The threat of censorship in the broadcast context is exacerbated by
the strong potential for pervasive regulation. Several factors contribute to
this potential. First, the FCC desires pervasive regulation of indecent
speech.223 Second, the FCC enjoys broad discretionary powers, particular-
218. See text accompanying notes 123-52 supra.
219. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 n.3.
220. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 123-51 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 58-75 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 89-95 supra.
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ly over license renewal, that make close judicial scrutiny difficult.22 4 Last,
the Pacifica Court's decision itself contributes to potentially broad
regulation. The Court implicitly encouraged pervasive regulation (I) when
it subscribed to the notion that regulations were necessary to l~rotect
unwilling adult listeners from the initial shock of indecent speech;' and
(2) when it failed to otherwise suggest minimizing regulation in this area in
light of the Commission's strong inclinations.
It is hoped both the Court and the Commission will, in the future,




The scenes to be seen
And the television sets
With his scissor purpose poised
Watching the human stuff




The ho-hum rooms of America
And with a kindergarten





Or anything with teeth
And renders





224. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 179-81 supra.
226. M. WILLIAMS, THE MASON WILLIAMS READING MATTER (1969), quotedin United Fed'nof
Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204, 210 (1969).
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